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As Tinbergen pointed out a quarter of a century ago, ethology employs many levels of 
investigation. Studies of psychological adaptations, and of current fitness functions, 
are two of them. All of these investigations are valid, none is intrinsically most im- 
portant, and each can be enhanced by the others. 
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T 
here’s more than one way to skin a grasshopper.” 
WHO ANTICIPATED SUCH A STATEMENT 
Tinbergen (1963), on the occasion of Lorenz’s 60th birthday, wrote his fa- 
mous paper “On Aims and Methods of Ethology.” In it, he distinguished 
four related fields of ethology, or “the biological study of behavior,” as he 
succinctly defined it. They were: 1) the study of causation, meaning the 
search for the the physiological mechanisms underlying any given behavior 
pattern; 2) the study of survival value, or of its fitness function; 3) the study 
of ontogeny, or the development of the behavior over the individual’s life 
history; and 4) the study of evolution, or of its phylogenetic history. In his 
discussion of the second, he wrote: 
In the post-Darwinian era, a reaction against uncritical acceptance of the 
selection theory set in. . . . It was a reaction against the habit of making 
uncritical guesses about the survival value, the function, of life processes 
and structures. This reaction, of course healthy in itself, did not (as one 
might expect) result in an attempt to improve methods of studying survival 
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value; rather it deteriorated into lack of interest in the problem-one of the 
most deplorable things that can happen to a science. Worse, it even de- 
veloped into an attitude of intolerance: even wondering about survival value 
was considered unscientific. (p. 417) 
In the quarter century since Tinbergen made that statement, there has 
been an explosion in the investigation of the survival, or fitness, function 
of animal behavior (see, e.g., Alexander and Tinkle 1981; Clutton-Brock 
1988; Krebs and Davies 1978) Following that precedent, a start has been 
made in studying the function of human behavior (see, e.g., Alexander and 
Tinkle 1981; Betzig et al. 1988; Chagnon and Irons 1979). Critical voices 
have continued to respond. With the exception that the phrase “fitness” 
should replace “survival value,” Tinbergen’s statement is on the mark 
today. This essay responds in turn. 
WHY STUDIES OF FUNCTION BEAR ON THE PROBLEM 
OF ADAPTATION 
The fact that a behavior promotes fitness in the present does not, by itself, 
make the case that such a behavior promoted fitness in the past. In other 
words, fitness need not be an outcome of selection (see, e.g., Gould and 
Lewontin 1979; Kitcher 1985; Symons 1987). As Tinbergen pointed out, a 
demonstration of the fitness effects of any trait is strictly no more than a 
demonstration of the current selection pressure for maintaining that trait. 
“What selection pressure must have been responsible in the past for the 
moulding of the character studied is speculative, however probable it often 
is” (Tinbergen 1963, p. 429). 
At least three lines of evidence, however, can be used to strengthen the 
inference of fitness-promoting cause from fitness-promoting effects. Tin- 
bergen (1963) himself suggested that one line of support for such an inference 
would come from evidence that relevant environmental constraints had re- 
mained strong enough for long enough to select for a trait. Paleontological 
evidence, and ethnographic reconstruction, would be relevant here (see, 
e.g., Lee and DeVore 1968). 
Another line of evidence supporting an inference of adaptive cause from 
effects is data on the existence of specific mechanisms or ontogenies, i.e., 
on any of the “missing links” (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby 1987) in the de- 
velopment of phenotypes from genes. An example makes this point. Ham- 
ilton argued in 1964 that apparent altruism may evolve where it sufficiently 
enhances the fitness of close genetic kin. Soon after that, many animal be- 
haviorists looked for, and found, correlations between altruistic behaviors 
and inclusive fitness effects (e.g., Sherman 1977). Following those studies 
of function, many researchers studied the ontogeny of “kin recognition,” 
looking for a mechanism by which kin might come to recognize, and even- 
tually to favor, close kin (e.g., Holmes and Sherman 1983). Evidence sup- 
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porting the existence of such ontogenies, and such mechanisms, has 
strengthened the inference of cause from effects. So would heritability stud- 
ies, showing that genes play a role in the development of mechanisms (e.g., 
Arnold 1988)., Heritability studies are likely to make such a contribution 
where selection has not been so strong as to eliminate genetic variance un- 
derlying the trait in question. 
A third way to strengthen the inference of adaptive cause from effects 
is simply to argue against alternative theories. If fitness-promoting traits are 
not products of past selection, what else might have produced them? An 
exhaustive list of alternatives includes the following. First are the random 
forces in evolution, including mutation and drift, which provide the raw 
material on which selection must act. Second is the nonrandom force in 
evolution, i.e., selection, which might have favored a trait because it per- 
formed a different function, or as a side effect of action on another part of 
the organism. Exaptation and allometry or pleiotropy would be included 
here (see, e.g., Gould and Lewontin 1979; Gould and Vrba 1982). Third is 
what might be called random environmental forces. Learning errors might 
be included here. Fourth are nonrandom environmental forces. “Culture” 
would probably belong here (see, e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cavalli- 
Sforza and Feldman 198 1; Durham 1979). 
Of these alternatives, it has been convincingly argued that the first, 
genetic drift, is highly unlikely to produce apparent adaptation (e.g., Dawk- 
ins 1986); the same probabilities should apply to the third alternative, en- 
vironmental “drift.” The stronger alternatives, the nonrandom genetic and 
environmental forces, can both be viewed as byproducts of selection. Non- 
random genetic changes like pleiotropy amount to compromises on one part 
of an organism to accommodate selection operating on another part. In a 
similar way, culture appears to be chosen and changed by individuals who 
do so in interests that are products of natural selection (e.g., Alexander 
1987); some of these choices, though, inevitably compromise others. It isn’t 
hard to think of maladaptive side effects of selection. Senescence, for in- 
stance, has been explained as a pleiotropic side effect of selection for re- 
productive vigor early in life (Williams 1957). In a roughly analogous way, 
pollution might be explained as a cultural side effect of selected for traits 
that, at least until recently, have increased resource access overall. It is, on 
the other hand, much more difficult to think up fitness-enhancing side effects 
of selected traits. In other words, each of these nonrandom alternatives, like 
the random ones, seems much less likely to produce fitness-promoting than 
fitness-reducing actions. 
This bears repeating. If “culture,” along with other forces, has not often 
led behaviors off the adaptive track, then it is even less likely that “culture,” 
or any other alternative, has led them on track. Alternative forces, even the 
nonrandom ones, never completely converge with the forces of selection. 
As a result, any of these alternative forces is more likely to have led be- 
haviors off the adaptive track than on. Spurious inferences of a past cor- 
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relation between behavior and fitness from a present one are unlikely. In 
other words, Tinbergen (1963) was right to use both the words “speculative” 
and “probable” in his statement about the inference of past selection from 
present function. The inference is speculative, because each of these alter- 
native explanations exists, so that the odds that present fitness is the product 
of past selection are never 100%. At the same time, the odds that any al- 
ternative force produced a correlation between behavior and fitness are al- 
ways less than the odds that they were produced by selection. Selection is 
the single most probable cause. 
WHERE TO FIND A FEW EXAMPLES 
Symons (1987) has said that studies of function “do not test any hypothesis 
about evolutionary processes or the human nature that these processes have 
produced.” But they do. One reason why Ifaluk chiefs may fail to turn status 
into fitness (Betzig 1988b), or Yanomamo kin terms may not be fudged in 
ways that increase access to mates (Chagnon 1988), or Tibetan polyandry 
might not be an adaptive strategy (Crook and Crook 1988), is that natural 
selection has been overestimated as a factor in evolution. The same is true 
of any prediction about function. Just as four alternatives to selection can 
explain an apparent fit between behavior and reproductive success, four 
alternatives can explain an apparent lack of fit. These include the possibilities 
that natural selection: 1) failed to compensate for random genetic effects, 
e.g., drift; 2) failed to compensate for nonrandom genetic effects, e.g., pleio- 
trophy; 3) failed to accommodate random environmental fluctuations, i.e., 
failed to generate adequate plasticity; and 4) failed to keep pace with non- 
random environmental change, e.g., because environmental change has been 
too sudden or strong. Research may bear any alternative out. 
Following Dawkins (1982; pp. 27-28), Symons confuses the issues of 
fitness cause and effect in his critique of Crook and Crook’s (1988) study of 
Tibetan polyandry (see Turke 1984). As Symons (1989) points out, polyandry 
itself is an a&zptation only if polyandrous people have spread genes for 
polyandry over the course of evolution. At the same time, polyandry is 
adaptive if it presently promotes the fitness of its practitioners (see discus- 
sions of adaptation in Burian 1983; Caro and Borgerhoff Mulder 1987; Wil- 
liams 1966). This Crook and Crook’s study suggests that it does. 
As Symons says, it is most unlikely that finding adaptive behaviors like 
power exploitation, kin term manipulation, and polyandry imply the exis- 
tence of adaptations specifying “keep the extra fish,” “reclassify women 
as cross cousins,” or “marry your brother’s wife.” That doesn’t mean that 
every one of those behaviors isn’t likely to have been produced by a number 
of adaptations, including strong psychological mechanisms promoting re- 
source gathering, mate winning, and assisting close kin. Unlike polyandry, 
or cross-cousin marriage, or redistribution of fish found on lfaluk reefs, each 
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of these behaviors probably had an important effect on the fitness of hunter- 
gatherers over the long haul of human evolution. If people who performed 
them better or worse did so in part because of differences in underlying 
mechanisms, tied in turn to differences in their genes, then those genes 
should have been favored by natural selection. It is highly likely that each 
of these complex behavior patterns is produced by a number of well-inte- 
grated adaptations (see, e.g., Alexander 1987; Gould and Lewontin 1979; 
Mayr 1983). Evidence supporting the existence of such mechanisms (among 
other forms of evidence) will strengthen the conclusion that, e.g., Tibetan 
polyandry currently promotes reproductive success because relevant be- 
haviors did so in the past. 
WHAT CAN AND CAN’T BE DONE 
To another group of critics, studies of behavior in any organism-from grass- 
hoppers to humans-are of value only in so far as they are, in effect, studies 
of its underlying nature. This group is large (see, e.g., Barkow 1984, 1989; 
Cosmides and Tooby 1987, 1989; Kitcher 1985, 1989; Daly and Wilson 1988; 
Symons 1987, 1989; Wilson 1978). Methods should, however, be judged 
better or worse in light of the specific problem they are meant to solve (see 
also Sherman 1988). 
For one thing, understanding each of these-human nature and human 
behavior-should contribute to our understanding of the other. Contrary to 
several suggestions (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby 1987, 1989; Symons 1987, 
1989; Tooby and Cosmides 1989), although the study of underlying adap- 
tations has often been considered a forbiddingly difficult endeavor (e.g., 
Caro and Borgerhoff Mulder 1987; Gould and Lewontin 1979; Williams 1966) 
it has seldom if ever been considered a trivial matter. As Tooby and Cos- 
mides (1989) and others point out, knowledge of specific mechanisms should 
predict behavior more accurately than general predictions about its adaptive 
function. At the same time, finding out what behaviors currently promote 
reproductive success leads directly to questions about underlying mecha- 
nisms. Knowledge of who we are illuminates what we do; and knowledge 
of what we do illuminates who we are. On the other hand, it is because there 
is often no simple one-to-one correspondence between mechanism and be- 
havior pattern that studies of function are nof equivalent to studies of caus- 
ation. Most complex- often the most interesting-behavior patterns, in 
grasshoppers and, especially, in humans, are likely to be produced by the 
interaction of a number of underlying adaptations (cf., e.g., Mayr 1983). 
Certainly this is true of behaviors like political exploitation, kin term ma- 
nipulation, and polyandry. It might even be the case with attractiveness 
judgments (see Symons 1989), incest avoidance (e.g., Kitcher 1989), and 
social contract logic (Cosmides and Tooby 1989); all these have been con- 
sidered independent adaptations. 
320 L. Betzig 
For another thing, studies of causation and function can bring different 
lines of evidence to bear on the theoretical problem of adaptation by natural 
selection. Studies of psychology make part of the case for adaptation by 
showing evidence of design; studies of fitness make part of the case for 
adaptation by showing that behaviors currently promote, or are likely to 
promote, fitness. Again, contrary to what many have recently stated or im- 
plied, both the structure argued to be a product of fitness differences (in 
studies of causation), and the behavior argued to enhance fitness differences 
(in studies of function), may be the effect of a constellation of adaptations 
(see Mayr 1983); and each of these may have been produced in turn by a 
variety of selective pressures over the course of evolution (see Gould and 
Vrba 1982). 
Finally, much recent criticism of function can be applied to studies of 
causation: both studies of nature and of behavior come with certain prob- 
lems. One is that any of the relatively simple behaviors named above- 
attractiveness judgments, incest avoidance, and social contract logic-might 
seem as easily predicted by common sense as any of the complex behav- 
iors-the exploitation of power, the manipulation of kinship terminology, 
and polyandry-listed earlier (contrast Cosmides and Tooby 1987, p. 277; 
see also Barkow 1984, 1989; Kitcher 1985, 1989; Symons 1987, 1989). How- 
ever, neither predictions about causation nor about function need overlap 
completely with common sense. Because common sense follows from com- 
mon experience, it can sometimes “predict” outcomes without recourse to 
theories of evolution. It is also true that common sense-which Kitcher 
(1985) elevated to the status of “folk psychology”-sometimes cannot. One 
reason is that people’s experiences are limited. Another reason, which fol- 
lows itself from Darwinism, is that we may have evolved to excel at self- 
deception (e.g., Alexander 1975). Because few paid ethologists have lived 
in traditional cultures, and because we seem so adept at e pluribus UHU~ 
deceptions in our own, common sense is sometimes at odds with the ex- 
pectation that power will be exploited (Betzig 1986a, 1988b), and often at 
odds with the finding that exploitation is translated into reproduction (Betzig 
1986b, 1988a,b). Means by which the powerful achieve reproductive ends 
can be especially surprising. As Chagnon (1988), for example, has pointed 
out, what structural anthropologist would have thought to find out that Yan- 
omam6 men manipulate kin terms to expand their pools of mates? As Symons 
(1989) himself points out, such predictions “frequently turn out to be more 
accurate than other social science predictions.” 
Another common problem is that both studies of causation and function 
can be led astray by wrong assumptions about environmental constraints. 
Mistaken assumptions about past conditions can result in mistaken predic- 
tions about the existence of underlying adaptations. And if current environ- 
mental conditions are too novel, then mechanisms may fail to develop, or 
to operate, as they did in the past. Failures in development will lead to faulty 
predictions about the existence of adaptations, and failures in operation will 
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lead to mistaken predictions about what behaviors will be adaptive (contrast 
Symons 1979). As Daly and Wilson (1984) point out, failure to bear out 
predictions about function can sometimes lend insight into underlying ad- 
aptations. This will be so if environmental conditions eliciting ontogeny are 
enough like those of the evolutionary past, while those eliciting behavior 
later on are not. 
A third common “problem” is that predictions about both nature and 
behavior will be wrong if any of the alternative evolutionary forces listed 
above has swamped selection. If alternative evolutionary forces have been 
too strong, looked-for adaptations and behaviors will be imperfect, or even 
nonexistent. 
HOW GENES FIT IN 
Again, it isn’t always easy to argue that behaviors currently promote fitness 
because they did so in the past. In order to avoid those problems, another 
line of criticism has taken the position that studies of cause be divorced from 
studies of effect. In one such critique, Caro and Borgerhoff Mulder (1987) 
concluded that “identification of adaptations according to . . . the repro- 
ductive benefits conferred on bearers, without any assumptions about the 
trait’s function in the past, guides a more cautious approach to the study of 
behavior” (p. 66, emphasis added; see also p. 69). Taken to its extreme, 
this can be cautious to the point of taking the history out of natural history. 
That might raise two important problems. First, a history of natural selection 
makes possible the prediction that traits will not be randomly related to their 
fitness effects. Without invoking it, ethology becomes a purely inductive 
enterprise. Second, Caro and Borgerhoff Mulder’s approach leaves unan- 
swered the important question of origin. Without reconstructing the selective 
pressures that might have shaped behaviors, gathering evidence on the ex- 
istence of underlying mechanisms themselves likely to have been shaped by 
evolution, or arguing against alternative theories, we may never make the 
case that the reason behaviors promote fitness in the present is because they 
did so in the past. As Caro and Borgerhoff Mulder themselves point out, if 
adaptive behavior “is not viewed as a product of selection, the need to 
measure reproductive success might be called into question” (p. 67). They 
counter that it may be enough that “with information on the different re- 
productive consequences of different behavior patterns, we are in some po- 
sition to make predictions about the distribution of morphological and be- 
havioral traits in present and future generations” (ibid; cf. Clutton-Brock 
and Harvey 1979). But if we have trouble reconstructing selective environ- 
ments in the past-a major difficulty, they point out, with studies of evo- 
lution-then how much more trouble will we have in predicting their future 
course? How interesting is it to know that traits currently correlate with 
fitness, with no idea as to whether that correlation is a product of selection, 
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or how substantially such selection may be maintained in future generations‘? 
To many, studies of fitness in the present are of interest because they try 
to answer the “why” question: because they help make the case that current 
actions are outcomes of natural selection (this agrees with Borgerhoff Mulder 
1987). 
Caro and Borgerhoff Mulder’s advocacy of studies of fitness effects 
without causes is sometimes echoed in other places. Dunbar (1988a p. 167; 
see also Dunbar 1984, 1988b), for example, wrote in another critique that 
“sociobiology is concerned centrally with the consequences of behavior in 
terms of gene propagation and it is a serious mistake to assume that this 
necessarily implies anything about the genetic control of ontogeny or, more 
importantly, of behavior itself.” Statements like these can exonerate evo- 
lution into oblivion. Again, a history of selection-of gene frequency 
change-is by far the most likely CC~US~ of, for instance, sex-biased invest- 
ment in Serengeti cheetah and Kenyan Kipsigis (Borgerhoff Mulder 1989; 
Caro 1987), and of facultative mating tactics in Gelada baoons (Dunbar 1984), 
behaviors that their investigators have taken pains to show promote fitness 
effects (see also Alexander 1987). 
A plausible explanation, then, for the fact that behaviors currently serve 
an adaptive function is that genes facilitating such behaviors were selected 
in the past (see, e.g., Dawkins 1986). That, as Dunbar is undoubtedly trying 
to point out (1988a, p. 167), tells us nothing about how easy or hard it may 
be to change them (e.g., Betzig 1986b, 1988a). Studies of Tinbergen’s fourth 
form of ethology, ontogeny, are needed to know that. 
WHEN NOT TO GIVE UP 
Toward the end of his famous paper, Tinbergen (1963, p. 430) assessed, in 
part, the value of Lorenz’s work by observing that “students of human 
behaviour are showing a growing interest in ethological methods.” That 
interest has continued to grow, prompting a number of recent critiques, and 
this response. Twenty-five years after Tinbergen, studies of function both 
inform and are informed by studies of causation, ontogeny, and evolution. 
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